Reduction in the Loans and Advances or Debtors on the asset side of it’s Balance Sheet to the extent of the provision for bad debt would be sufficient to constitute a write off: Held by SC in Vijaya Bank

Whether it is imperative for the assessee-Bank to close the individual account of each of it’s debtors in it’s books or a mere reduction in the Loans and Advances or Debtors on the asset side of it’s Balance Sheet to the extent of the provision for bad debt would be sufficient to constitute a write off

SC in the case of Vijya Bank vs. CIT 323 ITR 168 has held that

What is being insisted upon by the Assessing Officer is that mere reduction of the amount of loans and advances or the debtors at the year-end would not suffice and, in the interest of transparency, it would be desirable for the assessee-Bank to close each and every individual account of loans and advances or debtors as a pre-condition for claiming deduction under Section 36(1)(vii) of 1961 Act……..because the Assessing Officer apprehended that the assessee-Bank might be taking the benefit of deduction under Section 36(1)(vii) of 1961 Act, twice over.

In this context, it may be noted that there is no finding of the Assessing Officer that the assessee had unauthorisedly claimed the benefit of deduction under Section 36(1)(vii), twice over. The Order of the Assessing Officer is based on an apprehension that, if the assessee fails to close each and every individual account of it’s debtor, it may result in assessee claiming deduction twice over. In this case, we are concerned with the interpretation of Section 36(1)(vii) of 1961 Act. We cannot decide the matter on the basis of apprehensions/desirability. It is always open to the Assessing Officer to call for details of individual debtor’s account if the Assessing Officer has reasonable grounds to believe that assessee has claimed deduction, twice over. In fact, that exercise has been undertaken in subsequent years.

There is also a flipside to the argument of the Department. Assessee has instituted recovery suits in Courts against it’s debtors. If individual accounts are to be closed, then the Debtor/Defendant in each of those suits would rely upon the Bank statement and contend that no amount is due and payable in which event the suit would be dismissed.

Further Held by Supreme Court that if amount is recovered subsequently and it is more than difference between debt and amount so allowed , the balance can be taxed u/s 41(4).

How to Write off a debt as per provisions of Section 36(1)(vii)

Held by Supreme Court in Southern Technologies Ltd. [320 ITR 577]

If an assessee debits an amount of doubtful debt to the profit and loss account and credits the asset account like sundry debtor’s account, it would constitute a write off of an actual debt.

However, if an assessee debits `provision for doubtful debt’ to the profit and loss account and makes a corresponding credit to the `current liabilities and provisions’ on the liabilities side of the balance-sheet, then it would constitute a provision for doubtful debt. In the latter case, the assessee would not be entitled to deduction

Held by Supreme Court in Vijya Bank 323 ITR 168 

upholding the order of Tribunal and reversing the decision of High Court that besides debiting the Profit and Loss Account and creating a provision for bad and doubtful debt, the assessee-Bank had correspondingly/simultaneously obliterated the said provision from it’s accounts by reducing the corresponding amount from Loans and Advances/debtors on the asset side of the Balance Sheet and, consequently, at the end of the year, the figure in the loans and advances or the debtors on the asset side of the Balance Sheet was shown as net of the provision “for impugned bad debt”.

 

In the circumstances, we hold, on the first question, that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of deduction under Section 36(1)(vii) of 1961 Act as there was an actual write off by the assessee in it’s Books, as indicated above

Non consideration of certain arguments before SC does not make its judgement lesser binding

The binding effect of a decision of Supreme Court does not depend upon whether. a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided.

SmtSomavanti v. State of Punjab [1963] 2 SCR 774 and T. Govindraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu [1973] 3 SCR 222.

It would not be appropriate for Court to direct that Circular should be followed and not decision of Court : SC in Rattan Melting & Wire Industries

Ratan Melting & Wire Industries, 2008 (12) STR 416. At paragraph 6 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows “6. Circulars and Instructions issued by the Board are no doubt binding in law on the authorities under the respective statutes, but when the Supreme Court or the High Court declares the law on the question arising for consideration, it would not be appropriate for the Court to direct that the Circular should be given effect to and not the view expressed in a decision of this Court or the High Court. So far as the clarifications/circulars issued by the Central Govt. and/or the State Govt. are not concerned they represent merely their understanding of the statutory provisions. They are not binding upon the Court. It is for the Court to declare what the particular provision of statutes says, and it is not for the executive. Looked at from another angle, a circular which is contrary to the statutory provisions has really no existence in law

Supreme Court Settles the Income Tax matter of Tata Chemleot Project matter of MLAs in the favor of assesse in Balbir Singh Maini Case dtd 04-10-2017 [2017] 86 taxmann.com 94 (SC). However differs from High Court reasoning in CS Atwal case

Important Excerpts from the Order

1 An agreement of sale which fulfilled the ingredients of Section 53A was not required to be executed through a registered instrument. This position was changed by the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001. Amendments were made simultaneously in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and Sections 17 and 49 of the Indian Registration Act. By the aforesaid amendment, the words “the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or” in Section 53A of the 1882 Act have been omitted.

 

[Para 19 on Page 28 of SC Order]

 

2 There is no contract in the eye of law in force under Section 53A after 2001 unless the said contract is registered. (Para 20 on Page 31 of SC Order)

 

3 On the basis of Arguments above SC concluded that “……….we are of the view that sub-clause (v) of Section 2(47) of the Act is not attracted…………..”

[Para 20 on Page 32 of SC Order]

 

4 “…………..the High Court has held that Section 2(47)(vi) will not apply for the reason that there was no change in membership of the society, as contemplated. We are afraid that we cannot agree with the High Court on this score………………..”

 

“……………The High Court has not adverted to the expression “or in any other manner whatsoever. in sub-clause (vi), which would show that it is not necessary that the transaction refers to the membership of a cooperative society. We have, therefore, to see whether the impugned transaction can fall within this provision……………….” [Para 21 of SC Order]

 

5 A reading of the JDA in the present case would show that the owner continues to be the owner throughout the agreement, and has at no stage purported to transfer rights akin to ownership to the developer. At the highest, possession alone is given under the agreement, and that too for a specific purpose -the purpose being to develop the property, as envisaged by all the parties. We are, therefore, of the view that this clause [S(47)(vi)]will also not rope in the present transaction. [Para 23]

 

6 In the facts of the present case, it is clear that the income from capital gain on a transaction which never materialized is, at best, a hypothetical income. It is admitted that, for want of permissions, the entire transaction of development envisaged in the JDA fell through. In point of fact, income did not result at all for the aforesaid reason. This being the case, it is clear that there is no profit or gain which arises from the transfer of a capital asset, which could be brought to tax under Section 45 read with Section 48 of the Income Tax Act. [Para 27, Page 37 of SC Order]

 

7 Supreme Court in Excel Industries has said that “……………in our opinion more importantly, that income accrues when there “arises a corresponding liability of the other party from whom the income becomes due to pay that amount……………” [Para 26,Page35]

 

In the present case, the assessee did not acquire any right to receive income, inasmuch as such alleged right was dependent upon the necessary permissions being obtained. This being the case, in the circumstances, there was no debt owed to the assessees by the developers and therefore, the assessees have not acquired any right to receive income under the JDA. This being so, no profits or gains “arose” from the transfer of a capital asset so as to attract Sections 45 and 48 of the Income Tax Act. [Para 28]

 

8 Hence Supreme Court has concurred with the Conclusion of Punjab and Haryana High Court in CS Atwal but not with the reasoning .

There lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship and estate : Adiveppa v. Bhimappa(SC)

“…………22. It is a settled principle of Hindu law that there lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship and estate and in the absence of any proof of division, such legal presumption continues to operate in the family. The burden, therefore, lies upon the member who after admitting the existence of jointness in the family properties asserts his claim that some properties out of entire lot of ancestral properties are his self-acquired property. (See-Mulla – Hindu Law, 22nd Edition Article 23 “Presumption as to co-parcenary and self acquired property”- pages 346 and 347).

[2017] 85 taxmann.com 170 (SC) SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : 06-09-2017:Adiveppa v.Bhimappa

CCTV Cameras be installed in ITAT, Cestat says Supreme Court direction dt 14/08/2017in Pradyuman Bisht

Pradyuman Bisht Vs UOI (Supreme Court of India)

Writ Petition(s)(Criminal) No(s). 99/2015

Date of Judgement/Order : 14/08/2017

“………………….9. We asked learned Additional Solicitor General as to why the Union of India has not so far installed CCTV cameras in Tribunals where open hearing takes place like Court such as ITAT, CESTAT etc. as the tribunals stand on the same footing as far as object of CCTV camera are concerned. He is unable to dispute the utility and requirement of doing so and we see no reason why this should not be done. Recordings will help the constitutional authorities and the High Courts exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution over such Tribunals. We, therefore, direct that this aspect may now be taken up by learned Additional Solicitor General with the concerned authorities so that an appropriate direction is issued by the concerned authority for installation of CCTV cameras in Tribunals in same manner as in Courts and an affidavit filed in this Court………………………………….”