Delay of 21 days on wrong advice of CA condoned by ITAT

Appeal was handed over to the Chartered Accountant Shri Sumit Aggarwal. The said counsel advised that four months time was available for filing the appeal before the ITAT and since he was not appearing before the ITAT, he would engage some other professional for filing of the appeal. The said Chartered Accountant on his visit to a professional in Ambala for filing of the appeal, it was submitted, then learnt that the time limit for filing the appeal before the ITAT was infact 60 days from the date of the order and not 120 days as understood by him. Acting on the said information, the assessee was accordingly advised who promptly filed the appeal. The said appeal, it was submitted, was late by 21 days solely on account of the ignorance of the counsel. Relying upon; (a) Improvement Trust Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh Civil Appeal No. 2395 of 2008 of June 9, 2010, (b) Jayvantsinh N Vaghela v. ITO [2013] 40 taxmann.com 491 (Gujarat) and (c) Paras Rice Mills Kurukshetra v. CIT ITA No. 657 of 2009 (Punj. & Har.), prayer for condoning the delay was made.

Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals (P.) Ltd. [2017] 87 taxmann.com 32 (Chandigarh – Trib.) 04-10-2017

ITAT Ahmedabad’s applaudable initiatives for paper less Court mandated with effect from 31-12-2017

1.    Copies of ITAT orders to be sent to DRs, CIT A and DRP to be sent through e mail

2.    Registery of ITAT not to accept paper-books containing copies of any of the documents, copies of which are statutorily required to be filed anyway along-with the appeal itself, e.g. assessment order, CIT(A)’s order, DRP order, form 35, form 35A, form 36, grounds of appeal etc. The inclusion of these documents in paper-books is a common practice but it results in wholly avoidable wastage of paper, and is, therefore, discouraged.

 

3.    The registry will also not accept any paper book containing copies of judicial precedents reported in recognized journals and databases. The parties, however, may file copies of such reported judicial precedents when bench concerned, at the time of hearing, may specifically permit or require so.

4.    Paper to be used on both sides. o the extent possible and practicable to do so. Any document or paper-book, wherein paper is used only on one side and wilfully left unused on the other side, will not ordinarily be accepted by the Registry.

5.    Any document specifically prepared for the use of the Tribunal, including any applications and any written submissions, to be filed in our office, shall use the paper on both the sides, will use the font size of no more than 12.5 and will have an internal spacing of no more than 1.5 lines. Any documents or paper books, in violation of these guidelines, will not ordinarily be accepted by the Registry

 

6.    In all the internal functioning of this office, including in the judicial orders, the use of paper will be minimized to the extent possible by, inter alia, ensuring (i) that paper will henceforth be used on both the sides, ordinarily with a maximum font size of 12.5 and internal spacing of no more than 1.5 line.; (ii) that internal guard files for the judicial orders will henceforth be maintained only in digital mode; and that (iii) that use of email is required to be made, through secure official email accounts, as much as possible in all official communications. These requirements, however, do not restrict any officer of the Tribunal from making such exceptions to these general rules, as, in his considered opinion, may be justified or warranted on a case to case basis

7.    The hard copies of constitution of benches and the cause lists shall only be used for limited internal communications. However, a soft copy of the constitution of benches and the cause lists, in addition to being placed on the official website https://www.itat.gov.in and, with effect from today, in the twitter handle at https://twitter.com/itat_amd

 

8.    A guidance note on paperless operation of Court to be issued on or before 15-12-2017

Monetary limits for filing appeals shall also apply to Cross Objections u/s 253(4), says CBDT

CBDT vide letter dated 08-03-2016 has clarified that the monetary limit of Rs. 10 lakhs imposed vide Circular No. 21/2015 dated 10-12-2015 for filing appeals before the ITAT would apply equally to cross objections under section 253(4) of the Act. Cross objections below this monetary limit, already filed, should be pursued for dismissal as withdrawn/not pressed. Filing of cross objections below the monetary limit may not be considered henceforth i.e. wef 08-03-2016

Time for filing E-Appeals till 15-05-2016 before CIT A extended to 15-06-2016

E-appeals which were due to be filed by 15-5-2016 can be filed up to 15-6-2016. All e-appeals filed within this extended period would be treated as appeals filed in time. Taxpayers who could not successfully e-file their appeal and had filed paper appeals are required to file an e-appeal in accordance with Rule 45 before the extended period i.e. 15-6-2016. [CIRCULAR NO.20/2016 dtd 26-05-2016]

It is not open to the assessee in appeal to withdraw and/or the CIT(A) to dismiss the appeal on account of non-prosecution of the appeal by the assessee.

Just as it is not open to the Assessing Officer to not complete the assessment by allowing the assessee to withdraw its return of income, it is not open to the assessee in appeal to withdraw and/or the CIT(A) to dismiss the appeal on account of non-prosecution of the appeal by the assessee. – Bombay High Court there fore concluded in Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) [2016] 69 taxmann.com 407 (Bombay) dtd 25-04-2016

  1. As per Section 250(4), CITA is obliged  to make such further inquiry that he thinks fit or direct the Assessing Officer to make further inquiry and report the result of the same to him
  1. Further Section 250(6) of the Act obliges the CIT(A) to dispose of an appeal in writing after stating the points for determination and then render a decision on each of the points which arise for consideration with reasons in support.
  1. Section 251(1)(a) and (b) of the Act provide that while disposing of appeal the CIT(A) would have the power to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul an assessment and/or penalty.
  1.  Explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 251 of the Act also makes it clear that while considering the appeal, the CIT(A) would be entitled to consider and decide any issue arising in the proceedings before him in appeal filed for its consideration, even if the issue is not raised by the appellant in its appeal before the CIT(A).

The Bombay High Court there fore concluded in Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) [2016] 69 taxmann.com 407 (Bombay) dtd 25-04-2016 that:

  1. Thus once an assessee files an appeal under Section 246A of the Act, it is not open to him as of right to withdraw or not press the appeal .In fact the CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of the appeal on merits.
  1. In fact with effect from 1st June, 2001 the power of the CIT(A) to set aside the order of the Assessing Officer and restore it to the Assessing Officer for passing a fresh order stands withdrawn. Therefore, it would be noticed that the powers of the CIT(A) is co-terminus with that of the Assessing Officer i.e. he can do all that Assessing Officer could do.
  1. Therefore just as it is not open to the Assessing Officer to not complete the assessment by allowing the assessee to withdraw its return of income, it is not open to the assessee in appeal to withdraw and/or the CIT(A) to dismiss the appeal on account of non-prosecution of the appeal by the assessee.

Inordinate delay in release of Judgment

1.     As per Supreme Court in Kanwar Singh vs. Thakur Ji Maharaj , in ordinate delay in itself is sufficient  to set aside the judgment without going into the merits of the case.

  1. Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das Fateh  Chand Baswani held that long delay in releasing the judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculations.  The Court added that :”the party whose appeal is ultimately dismissed may justifiable fear that the arguments raised at the Bar may not have been reflected upon or appreciated by the Court at the time of dictating the Judgment”. Hence the apex Court dismissed the Madras Court Judgments kept reserved for five years.
  2. Supreme Court in Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 348 laid down certain guidelines to be observed by High Court and Others
  3. Apex Court in Suheli Leasing and Industry Ltd (2010) 36 PHT 267 held that after the arguments are concluded, an endevour should be made to pronounce the Judgment at earliest and in any case not beyond a period of three months. Keeping it pending for long time sends a wrong signal to the litigants and the society.
  4. In Shiv Sagar Veg Restaurant 176 Taxman 260(Bom) order of ITAT was set aside because there was in ordinate delay of 4 months
  5. Haryana Tax Tribunal in Punj Llods 48 PHT 89(HTT) taking a serious note of inordinate delay set aside the impugned order.

Comments

  1. As per Rule 34(5) of ITAT Rules

 The pronouncement may be in any of the following manners :—

          (a)  The Bench may pronounce the order immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing.

          (b)  In case where the order is not pronounced immediately on the conclusion of the hearing, the Bench shall give a date for pronouncement.

          (c)  In a case where no date of pronouncement is given by the Bench, every endeavour shall be made by the Bench to pronounce the order within 60 days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Bench shall fix a future day for pronouncement of the order, and such date shall not ordinarily be a day beyond a further period of 30 days and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given on the notice board.

Observations of ITAT Mumbai in Times Guaranty Ltd.(ITA 1681/M/2007) dtd 15-04-2015 on

Exception and Extraordinary Circumstances “of the case”

“…………..the inference that can be drawn that the relevant factors such as complexity of the matter, number of issues involved, lengthy arguments and discussions involved or the issue being of such importance that it requires more time and efforts, difference of opinion between the adjudicating members on some issue which require more discussion etc. can be safely said to be ‘exceptional and extraordinarily circumstances of the case.’ The factors/ circumstances such as one or both the concerned Member being on leave or his/their non availability for some reason for a particular period , his occupation in some other work of equal importance as may be entrusted by the Hon’ble President of the ITAT or due to the reason that the concerned Member/Members could not spare time because of hearing or in making decision in any other factually lengthy or involving complicated issue or of the nature which require a lot of time to get to the conclusion of the matter would also fall within the purview of the above stated phrase. It cannot be assumed that such exceptional and extraordinarily circumstances of the case would mean happening of any event which is never heard or seen or which is rarely seen to happen

………………………………………….

………………………………………….

Even, if the pronouncement of the order, for certain reasons, could not be done within the period of 90 days, there is a convention to seek the permission of the Hon’ble President for pronouncement of the same even after the period of 90 days. The above said conventions are being followed not under any statutory rules or regulations but because of the own devised procedure/convention of the Tribunal for the sake of quick disposal of the cases.

We may further point out that it is also the practice/convention that if the pronouncement of the matter is delayed for certain reasons for a considerable period, the matter is refixed for clarification so that the relevant points be refreshed in the memory and if so required matter can be heard afresh. This all depends upon the satisfaction of the Bench itself as to whether it is in a position to pronounce the order or that some clarifications are required or that a fresh hearing is required.

Further the word ‘ordinarily’ as mentioned in clause (c) of rule 34(5) is sufficient to explain that the period of further 30 days beyond the period of 60 days from the date of hearing, is not the end point and in special circumstances, order can be pronounced beyond the such further period of 30 days also. Reliance in this respect can be placed on the another decision of the Tribunal in the case of “Gift Holding (P.) Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer” [2012] 18 taxmann.com 103 (Mum.),

“………..It is pertinent to note that in the case in hand, there are certain developments with respect to the long leave and transfer of one of the Member constitution the Bench who have heard the appeal. It is transpired from the record that one of the Members Shri D.K. Shrivastava, AM, seating in the Beach who heard the appeal of the assessee was transferred from Mumbai Benches to Ahmedabad Benches of this Tribunal. Therefore, it appears that due to transfer of one of the Members of the Bench who have heard the appeal, there exists some extra ordinary circumstances which lead to the delay in pronouncement of the order. In the absence of any tangible material, glaring facts and circumstances of the case to show that by the reason of delay in pronouncement of the order, the Bench has ignored or failed to consider material facts or legal point of argument of the assessee. Merely because, there is a delay due to some exceptional circumstances, would not render the decision of the Tribunal as illegal or void. Therefore, in our view when the assessee has not brought on record anything to establish prima facie that any material fact or contention was left without considering by the Tribunal while passing the impugned order. Accordingly, we do not agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the assessee on this point, the same is rejected.

[Excerpt from Article Published in 54PHT(J) 1] and Comments added from Angle of ITAT Rules]

It is not open to the tribunal itself to raise a ground or permit the party who has not appealed to raise a ground, which will work adversely to the appellant

Old and Gold Rule of Law reiterated by Calcutta High Court in Sheo Kumar Mishra [2016] 70 taxmann.com 375 (Calcutta) FEBRUARY 26, 2016 that In the absence of an appeal or cross-objections by the department against the order in dispute, the Appellate Tribunal will have no jurisdiction or power to enhance the assessment. Under Section 251, CIT A has power to enhance the assessment but u/s 253 Tribunal does not have the power to enhance the enhancement. it is not open to the Tribunal itself to raise a ground or permit the party, who has not appealed, to raise a ground, which will work adversely to the appellant

 

Facts and Decision

The AO had treated  excess claim of certain transportation expense  amounting to Rs2.02 crores  as undisclosed Income of the assesse. He also opined that the assessee had shown bogus expenditures and bogus creditors, the peak credit whereof was Rs. 1.59 crores. He, however, did not treat said amount as undisclosed income on ground that said amount was less than the amount of excess claim of transportation charges and, therefore, no separate addition was made on this account. CIT A upheld order of AO

The Tribunal reversed addition of Rs. 2.02 crores on ground that said charges were already accounted for by the assessee in its account books and, therefore, could not be taxed. The Tribunal, however, confirmed addition of Rs. 1.59 crores on account of bogus expenditures

  Held by High Court that :It was not open to the Tribunal to confirm the addition of the sum of Rs. 1.59 crores because no such addition was made. In the absence of any such addition, there was no basis for the Tribunal to confirm the same. This addition was made by the Tribunal for the first time which the Tribunal could not have done.

The assessee did not raise the issue before the Tribunal of any addition of a sum of Rs. 1.59 crores because there was no addition of the sum of Rs. 1.59 crores or any part thereof. The assessee attempted to demonstrate the fallacy in the finding arrived at by the Assessing Officer by holding at one place that there was an undisclosed income of Rs. 2.02 crores and at another place by holding that there was an undisclosed income of Rs. 1.59 crores. When the Assessing Officer had not made the addition of Rs. 1.59 crores, the assessee had no occasion to challenge the same. When the assessee carried the matter to the Commissioner (Appeals), the latter, without anything more, could have enhanced the addition. But the Commissioner (Appeals) did not do so. He merely confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the subject matter of challenge before the Tribunal was the addition of Rs. 2.02 crores. The Tribunal could either have upheld the same or could have set aside the same. The Tribunal chose to set aside that addition. The matter should therefore have come to an end in the absence of any cross objection by the revenue.

References:

  1. State of Kerala v. Vijaya Stores [1979] 116 ITR 15 (SC)
  2. Motor Union Insurance Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1945] 13 ITR 272,(Bom)
  3. New India Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 844 (Bom)

Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Motor Union Insurance Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1945] 13 ITR 272, wherein the following views were expressed:

‘Apart from statute, it is elementary that if a party appeals, he is the party who comes before the Appellate Tribunal to redress a grievance alleged by him. If the other side has any grievance, he has a right to file a cross-appeal or cross-objections. But if no such thing is done, the other party, in law, is deemed to be satisfied with the decision. He is, of course, entitled to support the judgment of the first Officer on any ground open to him, but he is not entitled to raise a ground so as to work adversely to the appellant and in his favour. Apart from that, the section, in our opinion, does not permit the course adopted by the Tribunal in this case. Under S. 31, when the Legislature thought of giving power to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to enhance the assessment, it has in terms enacted that. In our opinion, that fact is against the contention that the words of S. 33(4) are wide enough to include a power of enhancement, without an appeal by the Commissioner. The, word “thereon” used in S. 33(4) only means “on the appeal,” which must mean on the grounds raised in the appeal. Read in that way, the sub-section only gives power to the Appellate Tribunal to give its decision and pass orders in respect of all grounds urged (which must be on behalf of the appellant) in respect of the decision, appealed against. In deciding those grounds it can pass appropriate orders. But, in our opinion, it is not open to the Tribunal itself to raise a ground or permit the party, who has not appealed, to raise a ground, which will work adversely to the appellant.’

The judicial principle pressed into service by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was later followed by another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of New India Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 844, and the same view was also endorsed by the Apex Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Vijaya Stores [1979] 116 ITR 15. Their Lordships were considering the question in connection with the powers of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal which was similar to the provisions of section 33 of the Income Tax Act of 1922 and this is what Their Lordships observed:

‘The normal rule that a party not appealing from a decision must be deemed to be satisfied with the decision, must be taken to have acquiesced therein and be bound by it, and, therefore, cannot seek relief against a rival party in an appeal preferred by the latter, has not been deviated from in sub-s. (4)(a)(i) above. In other words, in the absence of an appeal or cross-objections by the department against the AAC’s order the Appellate Tribunal will have no jurisdiction or power to enhance the assessment. Further, to accept the construction placed by the counsel for the appellant on sub-s. (4)(a)(i) would be really rendering sub-s. (2) of s. 39 otiose, for if in an appeal preferred by the assessee against the AAC’s order, the Tribunal would have the power to enhance the assessment, a provision for cross-objections by the department was really unnecessary. Having regard to the entire scheme of s. 39, therefore, it is clear that on a true and proper construction of sub-s. (4)(a)(i) of s. 39 the Tribunal has no jurisdiction or power to enhance the assessment in the absence of an appeal or cross-objections by the department. It is true that the two Bombay decisions reported in[1945] 13 ITR 272 and [1957] 31 ITR 844, on which the High Court has relied, have been rendered in relation to s.33(4)of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, but, in our View, the said provision of I.T. Act is in pari malaria with the provision of s. 39(4) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. Moreover, the Bombay High Court has pointed out in those decisions that s. 33(4) merely enacted what was the elementary principle to be found in the Civil Procedure Code that the respondent who has neither preferred his own appeal nor filed cross-objections in the appeal preferred by the appellant, must be deemed to be satisfied with the decision of the lower authority and he will not be entitled to seek relief against a rival party in an appeal preferred by the latter. In the first mentioned case, the elementary principle is stated at page 282 of the report thus:

 

“Apart from statute, it is elementary that if a party appeals, he is the party who comes before the Appellate Tribunal to redress a grievance alleged by him. If the other side has any grievance, he has a right to file a cross-appeal or cross-objections. But, if no such thing is done, the other party, in law, is deemed to be satisfied with the decision. He is, of course, entitled to support the judgment of the first officer on any ground open to him, but he is not entitled to raise a ground so as to work adversely to the appellant and in his favour.”‘

Assuming that another view was possible, that itself would be no ground to interfere with the order of the CIT(A) by ITAT unless it is shown that the appreciation of evidence by the CIT(A) was either perverse or untenable

While reversing the order of the CIT(A) the Tribunal is duty bound to examine and discuss the reasons given by the CIT(A) to hold one way or the other and then to dispel those reasons. If the Tribunal fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity.[Para 15] Assuming that another view was possible, that itself would be no ground to interfere with the order of the CIT(A) by ITAT unless it is shown that the appreciation of evidence by the CIT(A) was either perverse or untenable and that in holding in favour of the assessee the CIT(A) either ignored material evidence or that the view taken by him was patently untenable.[Para 17 of Judgement] Prahlad Bhattacharya [2016] 71 taxmann.com 63 (Calcutta) MARCH 4, 2016

A Court of appeal interferes not when the judgment under attack is not right but only when it is shown to be wrong

A Court of appeal interferes not when the judgment under attack is not right but only when it is shown to be wrong. (See Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty [1959 Supp 1 SCR 404 : AIR 1959 SC 429 : 1959 Cri LJ 526] ;Dattatraya Shankarbhat Ambalgi v. Collector of Sholapur [(1971) 3 SCC 43] and Dollar Company, Madras v.Collector of Madras [(1975) 2 SCC 730] .)