Posted on by Vinamar Gupta

For Condonation of Delay word “ sufficient cause” to be construed liberally

 

  1. Section 253(5) The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections after the expiry of the relevant period referred to in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause63for not presenting it within that period.
  2. Section 5 in The Limitation Act, 1963

5 Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. —Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.

3. Supreme Court of India :Collector Land Acquisition Vs.Mst. Katiji & Ors. Date of Judgment 19/02/1987: Bench: THAKKAR, M.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)Citation: 1987 AIR 1353, 1987 SCR  (2) 387, 1987 SCC (2) 107, JT 1987 (1) 537, 1987 SCALE (1)413 CITATOR INFO: R 1988 SC 897 (7)

“………….

  1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
  2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
  3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
  4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
  5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
  6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

………………………………….”

4. Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma[(2008) 8 SCC 321] in its para 9 held as under:

“11. The words “sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation” should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words `sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.”

5. Supreme Court of India Ramegowda, Major, Etc vs Special Land Acquisition … on 10 March, 1988 The contours of the area of discretion of the Courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See:

Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd., [1962] 2 SCR 762; Shakuntala Devi Jain v.Kuntal Kumari, [1969] 1 SCR 1006; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi and ors., [1979] 3 SCR 694; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, [1970] 2 SCR 90 and Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, [1987] 2 SCC 107 etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. In Katiji’s case, (supra), this Court said:

“When substantial justice and technical considerations are A pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay.”

“It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”